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Abstract 
After a number of recent incidents involving the transportation and storage of hazardous materials, 
many industry end-users wish to understand their level of risk exposure during the supply chain.  
This exposure can either be via actual ownership or when the product can be associated with the 
concerned party.  Ultimately, this may mean that an end-user’s procurement group will want to 
see that their suppliers of products and services are performing as needed in the control of these 
risks. 
A qualitative risk assessment is a technique by which these risks can be identified, understood, and 
evaluated.  This paper will describe the application of one such method, where the bowtie barrier 
analysis is central to the means by which this assessment is completed.  The barriers identified are 
those necessary to prevent and mitigate undesired events that could result in a fatality or a 
catastrophic incident to the environment, public, or a company’s reputation.   
The overall method employed in this process includes the following steps: 
1. Hazard identification 
2. Bowtie diagram development and barrier identification 
3. Barrier screening to identify safety critical elements - those that provide a credible 
reduction in the risk of fatalities or other major consequence 
4. Performance standard development for the safety critical elements 
The performance standards are then enforced appropriately throughout the supply chain. This will 
ensure that the transportation and handling of hazardous materials meet the purchasing concerned 
company’s expectations with regards to proper risk management. 
A quantitative risk assessment can also be completed to provide additional risk knowledge to aid 
in prioritization and decision-making. 
Introduction 
Nowadays dangerous goods (DG) are used in a wide range of industrial activities. These DGs 
include materials that are radioactive, flammable, explosive, corrosive, oxidizing or toxic. 
Accidents leading to release of DG can be lethal to human beings and damage the environment 
and public/private properties. Due to the dangerous nature of these goods, safety measures have to 
be considered along the entire supply chain. Therefore, regulations and safety standards are 
implemented to mitigate the risks related to the DG supply chain.  
 
A supply chain is a system of organizations, people, technology, activities, information and 
resources involved in moving a product or service from supplier to customer [1]. Over the last 
decade, many companies have been facing extreme supply chain challenges that stretched their 
capabilities to the breaking point. The transportation of dangerous goods is considered as the most 
critical and complex activity. Transportation of dangerous goods depends on various modes of 
transport namely, road, railway and sea.  
After a number of recent incidents involving the transportation and storage of hazardous materials, 
many in the industry wish to understand their level of risk exposure during the supply chain. This 
exposure can either be via actual ownership or when a material can be associated with the 
concerned party. Ultimately, this may mean that a supplier or end-user will want to see that their 
internal systems, as well as their suppliers, are performing as needed in the control of these risks. 
It is important to identify the high priority risk in the supply chain that allows determining which 
risks require a mitigation plan and which are the low impact risks. To manage the supply chain 
risks, there is a need to identify, prioritize and mitigate the risk.  
The system of supply chain is to be involved in the organization of the safety measures of the 
company for the incident. This can involve the safety of the supply chain. Mitigation is better than 
prevention of the accidents. There is a system of implementation of risk to manage the impact from 
an unwanted event.  
Approach to Risk Assessment in Supply Chain 
The approach to risk assessment consists of a number of stages and steps that, in principal are 
sequential. Initiation of the process can be triggered by a combination of various factors at any 
given point of time and varies from simple to very complex and detailed analysis. A preliminary 
qualitative analysis is conducted initially then followed by a more detailed quantitative analysis if 
deemed necessary. The initial step of qualitative analysis starts with understanding the supply 
chain for the hazardous material being sold/procured to identify the risk generating activities that 
include identifying the routes, frequency, modes of transport, and storage. For example, the 
elements in the truck transport of a material from the supplier to the facility include: 
Supplier storage – Loading in the truck – Road transport – Unloading at facility – Facility storage 
Once all the supply chain elements have been identified, the second step is to identify the 
appropriate data sources and collect risk relevant information and data. 
The next step would be to conduct a qualitative risk assessment on potential credible scenarios to 
identify and evaluate the risks. The risks that are identified to have major consequences are further 
assessed with the development of bowtie diagrams and critical controls, performance standards, 
and verification checklists.  
The final step in the process is to conduct a detailed quantitative risk assessment for the hazardous 
materials with potentially catastrophic consequences. This will aid in the understanding of the 
greatest levels of risk exposure in the supply chain.  
Qualitative Risk Analysis 
Initial qualitative risk analysis commences with the hazard identification to identify the causes or 
threats involved in the supply chain or what consequence a disruption would have. Hazard 
identification is a brainstorming process, involves consideration of previous risk assessments, and 
might involve surveys or other efforts to identify and list potential hazards within the supply chain. 
The process proceeds with listing of the unwanted events for each hazard and their consequences 
with the evaluation of severity and likelihood of each event. The output of this process is a supply 
chain hazard register listing the unwanted events for each step along with the unmitigated 
consequences... Rating is done using severity definitions of the risk matrix. Risk tolerable levels 
will depend on the criteria the organization has established for assessing the risks. The below figure 
demonstrates an example of risk assessment matrix. 
 
Figure 1. Risk Assessment Matrix 
The initial hazard register, even if including all identified risks for mapped processes, will likely 
not most significant risks to the supply chain. It is a starting point to identify relevant supply-chain 
risks.  Moreover, a hazard register is an evergreen document that evolves from incident learning 
and research findings. Once the top risks have been identified, a more sophisticated method such 
as the bow-tie method is used to fully understand the nature of the risk and to fine-tune rating the 
likelihood and consequence of the inherent risk. Typically there are many ways of initiating an 
event that can lead to the release of a hazard. At its simplest, a bow-tie diagram is a way of 
describing the relationship between an undesired event (top event), its potential causes (threats), 
consequences, and the preventative or mitigation measures in place. The top event can be thought 
of as the point at which control of a hazardous material is lost. For example, for the storage of 
flammable liquids, control is lost when there is an unplanned release of material that can escalate 
to a fire or explosion. 
The left hand side of a bow-tie diagram considers potential causes (e.g. corrosion, mechanical 
impact, incorrect operation of a valve) and the measures in place to ensure that these will not be 
realized.  The right hand side considers the potential consequences (e.g. environmental damage, 
health, safety, equipment damage etc.) and the measures in place to mitigate these consequences.  
Any known factor that can jeopardize the efficiency of a control is included in the Bow-tie diagram 
as an escalating factor. When controls are present to mitigate these escalating factors, they are also 
included and characterised using the same criteria as the controls that apply directly to a threat or 
a recovery measure. Figure 2 shows the graphical representation of a bow-tie diagram.  
 
Figure 2. Graphical Representation of a Bow-tie Diagram 
The bow-tie assessment allows drilling into each of the control and recovery measures to better 
understand the overall effectiveness of the control strategy. Each of the controls identified in the 
bow-tie assessment is characterized according to the following criteria: 
 Control type 
 Control effectiveness 
 Control criticality 
 Control owner 
Now not all controls have the same significance and importance. Some can be defined as “critical” 
to raise their visibility and surveillance. When identifying the critical controls, the following 
screening criteria have to be applied: 
 The control on its own stops the threat or prevents the consequences 
 The control used against multiple threats or to mitigate multiple consequences 
 The only control against a threat/only control to prevent the consequences 
Critical Control Monitoring Plan 
Once critical controls are identified, a monitoring plan is developed to define the expected 
performance of the control and the activities required to maintain its functioning as intended. The 
monitoring plan defines the critical controls’ objectives, performance requirements, and how 
performance is verified in the field for each critical control identified on the bow-tie diagrams. The 
two parts of the monitoring plan include, the operational side of the critical control; or what are 
the critical tasks associated with the control and the reliability part; or what needs to be done to 
make sure that the control will work as expected when needed. The monitoring plan template 
developed for the supply chain comprise a set of questions and the monitoring plan has to be 
completed with the involvement of operators, engineering, procurement team and other subject 
matter experts. Table 1 depicts the operation part of the control and Table 2 depicts the reliability 
part of the control. 
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Critical Control Verification Checklist 
Once the monitoring plans are populated, a verification checklist has to be developed for each 
critical control. Each critical control verification contain individual assurance activities that should 
be used by the individual assigned to verify the control’s health. Information regarding each critical 
control is gathered on behalf of the critical control owner who reports on the status of each critical 
control to the owner of the control. This information is designed to efficiently communicate 
variances between expected and actual critical control performance. 
Performance Standards 
Performance, measurement and monitoring criteria to assure the reliability and availability of 
critical controls are then defined to assure the performance of the controls. Critical controls are of 
no value unless they consistently perform when needed as expected. Performance standards define 
and document the attributes of the control. They ensure that the controls are inspected, maintained 
and tested, so it is not degraded overtime. Performance standards for the supply chain are 
developed as a verification checklist in a table format with queries related to the functioning of the 
critical controls that has to be filled in by the front line leaders and verified by the operational 
leaders. Figure provides an example of supply chain performance standards in the form of critical 
control verification checklist. 
 
Figure 3. Critical Control Verification Checklist 
The performance standards developed will be enforced appropriately throughout the supply chain. 
This will ensure that the transportation and handling of hazardous materials meet the concerned 
party's expectation with regards to proper risk management. 
Quantitative Risk Analysis 
The final step in the process of supply chain risk assessment is to conduct a detailed quantitative 
risk assessment for the hazardous materials with potentially catastrophic consequences. 
Quantitative analysis is used for most catastrophic events that need more precise numerical 
analysis to estimate the damage and frequency of occurrence. This quantitative analysis will aid in 
prioritization and decision-making with regards to managing the risk of the supply chain. The 
process starts with the identifying the DG with greatest level of risk exposure with societal 
consequence (fatality risk). Then the risks from multiple supply chain elements are added to assess 
the total simulation with one criterion and to determine the risk drivers. An F-N curve is 
constructed with the estimation of occurrence for each event.  
The resulting F-N curves for the supply chain events are plotted separately by supply chain element 
and for all elements combined. The F-N curves include the societal risk criteria presented in HIPAP 
4 [7] to illustrate the as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) principle. A level of risk above 
the dashed red line is indicative of an intolerable level of risk, while a level of risk below the green 
dashed line is indicative of a negligible level of risk.  The region between the two lines is indicative 
of risk in the ALARP range and mitigation measures would be expected to be implemented to 
reduce the risk, unless the reduction of risk was grossly disproportionate to the effort required.  
HIPAP 4 emphasizes that the criteria shown are indicative and provisional, and do not represent a 
firm requirement. 
QRA Case Study Results 
In the case study presented for illustration, hazardous material 1 is transported as cylinders or 
drums in a truck navigating through sparsely populated areas. Hazardous material 2 is transported 
by rail from densely populated areas and is stored at a storage location surrounding a major city. 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 depict the F-N curves for hazardous material 1 & 2. Hazardous material 1 
risk is in the negligible region of the F-N curve. Hazardous material 1 risk is small because of the 
small amount of material handled (both quantity handled and frequency of handling), as well as a 
limited population exposure to release events. 
Hazardous material 2 risk is in the ALARP region of the F-N curve, and approaches, but does not 
cross, into the intolerable region. Hazardous material 2 risk is mostly from rail transport because 
the route includes many densely populated regions, many with small set-back distances from the 
rail route. The storage risk from storage facility is greatly limited by the limited number of persons 
exposed due to the 0.5 mile distance to the nearest highly populated areas. 
High transport risk follows from a combination of high population densities (higher number of 
potential fatalities) and long route exposure distances (which results in higher event frequency in 
the vicinity of highly populated areas). The actual rail risk might be lower than reported here, if 
the actual rail route would bypass some of the high density populated regions.  
 
Figure 4. F-N curve for Hazardous Material 1 
 
Figure 5. F-N Curve for Hazardous Material 2 
The transport risk involved with the transport of hazardous material 1 & 2 can be compared from 
the figure below. Left corner section of Figure 6 presents the transport route of hazardous material 
1 representing the truck transport through sparsely populated areas. Middle section of the figure 
indicates the storage location of hazardous material 2 and the consequence distance in the event of 
an explosion. The red line in the right section of the figure indicated the transport route of 
hazardous material 2 through densely populated areas and the radial distance that an explosion 
could affect.   
Material 1 truck transport route Material 2 storage Material 2 transport route
Figure 6. Transport Route of Hazardous Materials 1 & 2 
Conclusion 
The overall risk analysis is a collaborative method involving personnel from procurement, product 
supplier, HSE & Operations, Transportation Authority, Transport and storage providers. Effective 
supply chain risk analysis is essential to a successful organization. It is important to understand 
the potential risks associated with the type of goods that are being procured by the organization 
and the detailed understanding of this process goes beyond legal requirements on transportation of 
dangerous goods. 
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